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This paper provides a model to explain the shakeout of the U.S. ATM and debit 
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introducing the debit function in the mid 1980s — played in driving the network 
consolidation. Consistent with the theory, our empirical findings show that large 
networks had a better chance of adopting the debit innovation and surviving the 
shakeout. However, in contrast to previous studies, we find little advantage of being 
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 1 Introduction
As an industry evolves from birth to maturity, we typically observe price falls, output
rises, and ﬁrm numbers initially rise and later fall (Gort and Klepper, 1982; Klepper and
Graddy, 1990). Eventually, only a small number of ﬁrms survive and the market becomes
concentrated. The non-monotonic time path of ﬁrm numbers, termed as “shakeout,” is
the focus of many recent studies of industrial economics. Two important questions have
been debated in the literature: First, what drives the industry shakeout? Second, which
ﬁrms are more likely to survive the shakeout and why?
Regarding the ﬁrst question, some studies suggest that technological changes play
an important role. It has been shown that the industry shakeout can be triggered
by “emergence of dominant design” (Utterback and Suárez, 1993), “race of innovation”
(Wang, 2007; Jovanovic and MacDonald, 1994), and “scale economies in R&D” (Klepper
and Simons, 2000; Klepper, 1996). In addition, Wang (2008) shows that the evolving
consumer demand over industry life cycle may also contribute to the shakeout.
The second question has also attracted much attention. Many studies consider tech-
nological advantages and scale economies, often related to ﬁrm age (cohort), as the crit-
ical factors that determine ﬁrm performance and survival. Analyzing the emergence of
large-scale enterprise in the U.S., Britain and Germany, Chandler (1990) found that early
industry entrants tend to perform better and survive longer due to their “ﬁrst-mover
advantages.” The view is strongly supported by recent empirical studies on shakeouts of
several U.S. manufacturing industries (Klepper and Simons, 2005).
This paper explores these two questions in the context of the U.S. ATM and debit
card industry. Unlike most manufacturing industries studied in the literature, the ATM
and debit card industry is a ﬁnancial service industry featuring strong network eﬀects.1
1There has been a growing literature on the ATM and debit card industry, but our paper is the ﬁrst
one to analyze the shakeout in this industry. Other papers studied ATM adoption (Saloner and Shepard
1995; Hannan and McDowell, 1984), ATM surcharges (Hannan, 2007; Massoud and Bernhard 2002),
ATM compatibility (Knittel and Stango, 2008; Hannan and Borzekowski, 2007), banking competition
(Ishii, 2005; Matutes and Padilla, 1994) and consumer welfare (Knittel and Stango, 2008; Gowrisankaran
and Krainer, 2006). Some other studies looked at the two-sided market eﬀects on debit transactions
(Hermalin and Katz, 2006).
1In the early 1970s, the industry started with a few shared ATM (Automated Teller
Machine) networks, in which ATMs were shared among multiple ﬁnancial institutions.
The number of shared networks grew rapidly to more than 120 in the mid 1980s, but
declined sharply afterwards. This raises interesting research questions: What drove
the industry shakeout in spite of the rising ATM transaction volume?2 Which ATM
networks had fared better than others through the consolidation?
While the existing theories shed light on certain aspects of these questions, this
paper focuses on a new perspective — the role of network-enhancing product innovation.
Particularly, we construct a theoretical model of industry shakeout emphasizing the role
that a major product innovation — introducing the debit function in the mid 1980s —
played in driving the network consolidation. The debit innovation greatly enhances the
function of ATM cards, allowing customers to use them not only at ATMs but also at
retail locations to pay for goods and services. This extends the industry from a one-sided
market of ATM services into a two-sided market serving both consumers and merchants
at the point of sale (POS). As a result, the enhanced network eﬀects spurred a race of
adopting the debit function, in which large ATM networks had better advantages given
their cardholder base and infrastructures in place. Eventually, the winners of the race
survived and expanded, and the losers had to exit. The theory is supported by our
empirical ﬁndings, which show that large networks had a better chance of adopting the
debit innovation and surviving the shakeout. Moreover, in contrast to previous studies,
we do not ﬁnd that early entrants in this industry enjoyed strong ﬁrst-mover advantages,
but rather they suﬀered some disadvantages in organizational structure that negatively
aﬀected their size and survival.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the background of the U.S. ATM
and debit card industry. Section 3 presents our theoretical model that characterizes the
impact of a major product innovation — introducing the debit function — on industry
dynamics. Section 4 takes our theory to the empirical study using a novel dataset on
network entry, exit, size, location, ownership and product choices. Section 5 concludes.
2A c c o r d i n gt ot h eE F TD a t aB o o k , the U.S. ATM transaction volume continued strong growth
between 1985 and 2000, with an average annual growth rate of 8.5%.
22 Industry Background
The late 1960s marked the beginning of modern ATM and debit card industry. The ﬁrst
ATMs were basically cash-dispensing machines.3 By the early 1970s, ATM technology
had advanced to the system we know today. ATMs were developed to take deposits,
transfer money between checking and savings accounts, provide cash advances from
credit cards, and take payments. ATMs also were connected to computers, allowing
real-time access to information about cardholder account balances and activity. By con-
necting ATMs of multiple ﬁnancial institutions (banks) to a centralized system, shared
networks began to emerge in the early 1970s (Felgran, 1984).
Shared ATM networks generally take one of two forms of organization. First, a
ﬁnancial institution with a proprietary network can share with franchisees who purchase
access to an entire system of terminals and computers. In this case, the proprietary
network drives all the ATMs and does all the processing for the franchisees. Second,
several ﬁnancial institutions can share a network through a joint venture. As in the
cases of any joint venture, ownership is divided in some way. Whether all or only some
network participants share the ownership depends on the arrangements made. In some
cases, a third party such as a data processing company may retain an interest in the
network. In later years, especially after the mid 1990s, nonbank ownership has become
increasingly popular.
A shared network allows cardholders to use any ATMs of participating banks in the
network. This not only enhances consumer convenience but also extends the geographic
service area of banks. In the early years of the industry, most shared ATM networks
were regional in scope.4 In return for providing the sharing service, networks charge fees
to participating banks, which then pass the charges to their customers.5
3In 1967, England’s Barclays Bank installed the ﬁrst cash dispenser. In 1968, Don Wetzel developed
the ﬁrst ATM in the United States using the modern magnetic stripe access card.
4In some cases, some regional networks might establish sharing agreements allowing one network’s
cardholders to access another network’s ATMs under certain conditions and payments, but each network
would maintain its separate identity and revenue.
5In reality, a bank either charges its customers explicit fees for card transactions (e.g., per-transaction































Figure 1: Entry, Exit and Number of Shared Networks
The 1970s saw steady growth of shared ATM networks and the number of networks
peaked around 120 in the mid 1980s. However, the industry went through a big shakeout
afterwards. Half of the networks had exited by the mid 1990s and less than 30 networks
survived to 2006. Figure 1 plots entry, exit and the number of shared networks from
1972 to 2006.6
Several major events could have contributed to the shakeout. First, the U.S. Supreme
Court ruled in 1985 that ATMs did not represent bank branches so they were not subject
to the interstate branching restrictions. By removing a potential barrier to forming
networks across state lines, the U.S. Supreme Court decision may have facilitated the
industry consolidation to some extent.7
Second, the POS debit function was introduced in the mid 1980s, which allows con-
sumers to use ATM/debit cards to pay for goods and services at retail locations. Besides
replacing the costly paper-based payments, the debit innovation extended the industry
6Data Source: EFT Data Book’s various issues.
7However, the interstate branching restrictions were certainly not the only factor limiting network
size. In fact, multiple networks within each single state were very popular at the time. For example,
Illinois and Kansas each had 11 networks, Ohio had 10 networks and Florida had 9 networks in 1984
(Felgran, 1984).
4from a one-sided market of ATM services into a two-sided market serving both consumers
and merchants at the point of sale. The enhanced network eﬀects and scale economies
made it increasingly economic to operate larger networks (Felgran, 1985). In the follow-
ing decade, the industry experienced substantial development in networks’ adoption of
the debit function. By 1987, 34 percent networks had adopted debit capability and the
ratio rose to 54 percent in 1995. As a result, the debit innovation had important impact
on the industry evolution.
Third, several other changes took place after the mid 1990s which may have con-
tributed to the industry consolidation at the later stage. Those changes include inter-
state banking deregulation and rising nonbank ownership of networks.8
While multiple factors are associated with the shakeout, our analysis focuses on the
impact of the debit innovation. In the next section, we construct a theoretical model
that characterizes the process how the debit innovation triggers an adoption race and
drives the shakeout. We then take the theory to data in Section 4. Our empirical study
allows for the possibility that multiple factors may have contributed to the shakeout,
and provides evidence that the debit innovation played an important role.
3T h e o r y
We construct an industry life cycle model in the spirit of Jovanovic and MacDonald
(1994), in which forward-looking networks make optimal decisions on entry, exit and
product choice in a competitive market. Given the context of the ATM and debit card
industry, we build two important features in the model. First, we consider networks
to be heterogenous in size and they provide diﬀerent quality of products and services.9
Second, we model the debit function as a network-enhancing product innovation (instead
of a cost-saving technological innovation) that drives the industry evolution.
8For example, the Riegle-Neal Act was passed in September 1994, allowing banks and bank-holding
companies to freely establish branches across state lines. Nonbank ownership of networks has also
increased. Among the top 20 regional networks, the number of nonbank-owned networks was two in
1990 and six in 2000 (See Hayashi, Sullivan and Weiner 2003).
9The quality of card services refers to the convenience beneﬁt of card usage to cardholders, which
depends on the card network size and card functions.
53.1 Model Setup
The model is cast in discrete time and inﬁnite horizon. The environment is a competitive
market for ATM and debit card services. Two generations of cards appear on the market
subsequently. The ﬁrst one is an ATM-only card, which allows card users to withdraw
cash from ATMs. The second generation is the ATM/debit card, which allows card users
to withdraw cash from ATMs as well as pay at the point of sale (POS).
On the supply side, the ATM and debit card services are provided by shared networks.
During the ﬁrst generation of cards, ATM-only networks exist. We assume there are two
sizes of ATM-only networks, small  and large . After the second generation of cards
is introduced, ATM/debit networks become available. We assume there is one size of
ATM/debit networks, denoted as . Each network charges a fee  per card according
to the network type  = {}, and incurs an initial ﬁx e dc o s ta sw e l la sv a r i a b l ec o s t s
to operate.10
On the demand side, consumers use card services provided by a shared network
through their banks. There is a continuum of banks of mass one in the market. For
simplicity, we assume each bank serves the same number of customers, which is normal-
ized to be one.11 To provide its customers ATM or ATM/debit services, banks need to
participate in a shared network and pay a fee  per card to the network according to
the network type  = {}.
When banks decide which network to join, they consider the quality of the card
services provided by diﬀerent networks. Naturally, an ATM/debit card is more beneﬁcial
to the card users than an ATM-only card because of the additional debit function, and
an ATM-only card issued by a large network is better than an ATM-only card issued by
a small network because the former can be used at more ATM locations. Let  denote
the quality of card services, and we hence assume     .F o r a b a n k ,o ﬀering
ATM or ATM/debit services raises its customers’ willingness to pay for banking services
and increases its total revenue by .H e r e is a bank-speciﬁc factor, which refers to
10Note that assuming networks charge per transaction fees instead of per card fees would not aﬀect
our analysis since the number of card transactions is closely related with the number of cards.
11Note that bank size does not play a role in our analysis so this is an innocuous assumption.
6its customers’ general preference for card services. We assume  is distributed across
banks according to the cdf function () on [0+∞),w h e r e(0) = 0 and (+∞)=1 .






3.2 Before the Debit Innovation
T h em a r k e ts t a r t sa tt i m e0 when the shared ATM service becomes available. Potential
network entrants, denoted by , are of an inﬁnite measure. Each period, a potential
entrant may choose to enter the market or take an outside option with a payoﬀ .
An entrant pays an initial ﬁxed cost to set up a shared ATM network. There are two
o p t i o n s :O n ei st op a yah i g hﬁxed cost  to set up a large network; the other is to pay
al o wﬁxed cost  to set up a small network. After entering the industry, a network
can choose to change its size. Upgrading a small network to a large network requires an
additional cost (e.g.,  − ). Downsizing or exiting does not incur additional costs,
but the initial sunk costs can not be recovered.
For each network type  = {}, the return at time  is a proﬁt ﬂow of 
,w h i c h
depends on price 
 and cost (
); i.e., 




)}.H e r e refers to a
convex cost function, and 
 is the quantity supplied by network  in terms of its number
of ATM cards in circulation.12 Since the cost function has the standard properties, we
have    0 and   0 for  = {}.
For simplicity, we assume setting up an ATM network involves no uncertainty, and
the probability that future innovations may arrive is too small to aﬀect a network’s













12The convex cost reﬂects the fact that networks have to bear various operational, regulatory and
coordinating constraints, which give rise to numerous regional networks.
7
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 are the value of a potential entrant ,as m a l ln e t w o r k and a large
network  at time  respectively, and  is the discount factor.
D u et of r e ee n t r y ,t h e r ee x i s tp r i c e s∗ and ∗ at which potential network entrants

















Because   , Eq. (1) suggests that (∗)  (∗)  . According to the
proﬁt function properties, this implies that ∗  ∗and (∗)  (∗).T h e r e f o r e ,
a large ATM network charges a higher price, earns a higher proﬁta n dh a sm o r ec a r d s
in circulation than a small ATM network.
On the demand side, banks choose which network to participate in.13 Particularly,
banks with a high  (∗
−∗









 −  
Accordingly, the demand for large networks’ ATM cards is  =1−(∗
−∗
− ) Mean-
while, banks with a moderate  (∗
−∗
− ≥  ≥ ∗









 −  ≥  ≥
∗
 
Accordingly, the demand for small networks’ ATM cards is  = (∗
−∗
− ) − (∗
 ).
Finally, banks with a low  (∗
 ) choose not to join any network and they do not
provide card services to their customers.
13Without loss of generality, we assume both small and large networks’ cards are in demand at the
equilibrium.



















where  and  are the number of large and small ATM networks respectively.
Note that, at equilibrium, no network has incentive to change its size, and no addi-
tional entrant has incentive to enter. For a large network  or a small network , because
the initial investment is sunk and (∗)  (∗)  , the network would not want
to downsize or exit. For a small network  or a potential entrant , increasing output
would drive down the industry price and does not justify the investment, so the small
network or the potential entrant has no incentive to expand or enter.
Equations (1), (2) and (3) describe a simple industry equilibrium path: At time 0,
potential entrants make their entry and size decisions. Then, from time 1 and afterwards,
there are  large networks each serving (∗) cards and  small networks each serving
(∗) cards Meanwhile, there are 1 − (∗
−∗
− ) banks that demand large networks’
cards at the price ∗,a n d(∗
−∗
− ) − (∗
 ) banks that demand small networks’
cards at the price ∗. The industry supply for each type of cards meets the demand.
There is no further industry dynamics.
3.3 After the Debit Innovation
At time , the debit innovation arrives as an unexpected shock. As a result, networks
have chance to oﬀer a superior product, the ATM/debit card. To set up an ATM/debit
network , a new entrant , a small ATM network  or a large ATM network  needs
to invest a ﬁxed cost  or , respectively. Naturally, we assume     .
We also assume there is uncertainty associated with setting up an ATM/debit network.
Namely, for a type  network,  = {}, the attempt may succeed with probability 

or the network may fail and remain its original type. Once succeed, the proﬁt ﬂow of an
9ATM/debit network 
 depends on the price 
 and cost (
), i.e., 






The probability of successfully setting up an ATM/debit network is assumed to vary
by network type. Particularly, a large ATM network is more likely to succeed than a




 This is due to two important reasons. First, for a debit
system to function, a network needs to bring both merchants and consumers on board.
A large ATM network, with a bigger cardholder base, is more attractive for merchants
and consumers to accept or use its debit cards. Second, a large ATM network, with
better infrastructures in place, needs to invest less to adopt the debit function, i.e.,
    . This may also help raise its probability of success.
Because of the new proﬁt opportunity, networks need to reconsider their entry, exit
and product choice. At each time  ≥  , the following value functions are for a new




















































































10Equations (4) to (7) imply the following:
• A potential entrant  has four options: (1) staying outside the industry; (2) paying
a ﬁxed cost  to enter as a small ATM-only network; (3) paying a ﬁxed cost 
to enter as a large ATM-only network; (4) paying a ﬁxed cost  to try setting up
an ATM/debit network with the probability of success 
.
• A small ATM-only network  has four options: (1) exiting the industry; (2) staying
as it is; (3) paying a ﬁxed cost (−) to upgrade to a large ATM-only network;
(4) paying a ﬁxed cost  to try upgrading to an ATM/debit network with the
probability of success 
.
• A large ATM-only network  has four options: (1) exiting the industry; (2) down-
grading to a small ATM-only network; (3) staying as it is; (4) paying a ﬁxed cost
 to try upgrading to an ATM/debit network with the probability of success 
.
• An ATM/debit network  does not need further investment, and can choose what-
ever option , ,  or  to pursue the highest proﬁt.
3.4 Industrial Evolution: Characterization
The debit innovation creates a superior product, the ATM/debit card. Because an
ATM/debit card oﬀers enhanced services than ATM-only cards (i.e.,     ), it
also charges a higher price (i.e., 
  
  
 )a tt h ee q u i l i b r i u m . 14 The proﬁt function
properties suggest that (
 )  (
)  (
 ) and (
 )  (
)  (
 ).
Therefore, an ATM/debit network charges a higher price, earns a higher proﬁt and has
more cards in circulation than an ATM-only network.




and characterize the industry dynamics. Note that depending on model parameter
values, a number of equilibrium paths may exist. To keep our discussion focused, we
discuss one equilibrium path that most resembles the empirical pattern.
14Note that if a low-quality card charges a higher price than a high-quality card, it would have no
demand.
11At time ,a sl o n ga st h ee n t r yc o s t can be justiﬁed by the potential proﬁts, a
number  of new entrants attempt to set up ATM/debit networks. Meanwhile, all
existing ATM-only networks attempt to adopt the debit innovation.15 Since it takes one
period for the adoption to take eﬀect, there is no change in price and output at time .
At time  +1 , among all the  entry attempts, a fraction 
 successfully enters
as ATM/debit network and (1 − 
) fails and exits. Among the  () large (small)
incumbent networks, a fraction 
(
) succeeds in becoming ATM/debit networks. The
rest of the networks have to try adopting the innovation again in the next period. As
the supply increases, the price of ATM/debit cards  is expected to fall over time, so
no more entry from outside the industry is proﬁtable at time  +1and afterwards.
After time  +1 , more incumbent ATM networks succeed in adopting the debit
innovation, so the total number of cards issued keeps rising and the prices of all the
three types of cards  and  keep falling.16 At time 0,t h ep r i c e falls enough
so that small ATM-only networks, due to their relatively low success rate 
 and high
investment ,n ol o n g e rﬁnd it proﬁtable to invest in the debit innovation. Hence,















[1 − (1 − 
)
−]+





However, large ATM-only networks continue to try adding the debit function after
time 0. Hence, the supply of ATM/debit cards continues to increase and drives down the
card prices  and . Eventually, the price of small networks’ ATM cards reaches
ac r i t i c a lv a l u e

00 at time 
00 so that small ATM-only networks become indiﬀerent
between staying and exiting the market. During the period 0 ≤ 
00,t h en u m b e ro f
each type of networks is
15We assume that after the debit innovation arrives, it is not proﬁtable for any new entrant to enter
as an ATM-only network, or any small ATM-only network to upgrade to a large ATM-only network.
16Note that the three types of cards are substitutes, so the increasing supply of ATM/debit cards















[1 − (1 − 
)
−]+





During the period  +1 ≤ 














































At time 00, the price of small networks’ ATM cards reaches the critical value 
00 at
which (







































Hence, the number of exiting small ATM-only networks 









For  00, as the rest of large ATM networks continue to adopt the debit innovation,
additional small ATM-only networks exit to keep the price at 
00, and the number of
exiting networks 
















Later on, after all small ATM-only networks exit, card prices  and  may fall
again. Eventually, depending on model parameter values, large ATM-only networks may
exit the industry all together or coexist with ATM/debit networks in the long run.
4 Empirical Analysis
Our theory characterizes the process how a major product innovation — introducing the
debit function — spurs an adoption race and drives the shakeout in the ATM/debit card
industry. To check its empirical relevance, we conduct an empirical study in this section
using a novel dataset on network entry, exit, size, location, ownership and product
choices. The ﬁndings conﬁrm the two main hypotheses of our theory. First, large ATM
networks have a better chance of adopting the debit innovation. Second, small ATM-
only networks tend to exit before large ATM-only networks, and ATM/debit networks
are most likely to survive the shakeout.17 Moreover, in contrast to previous studies,
we ﬁnd little advantage of being an early industry entrant. Rather, ownership and
organizational structure had an important inﬂuence on network size and survival.
4.1 Data
The data are drawn from various issues of the EFT Data Book from 1985 to 2006.18
The Book lists the leading regional EFT networks (ATM/debit networks or ATM-only
networks in our deﬁnition) in the United States, and provides each network’s (1) year
17Note that our theory yields a deterministic path: Given a constant outside option, small ATM
networks exit the industry ﬁrst, then followed by large ATM networks. ATM/debit networks survive
to the end. To test the theory with data, we then need to add some randomness. For example, if we
assume each industry player has an i.i.d. draw of the outside option, then our theory implies that small
ATM networks tend to exit before large ATM networks, and ATM/debit networks are most likely to
survive the shakeout.
18ATM&Debit News (formerly, Bank Network News) publishes the E F TD a t aB o o kannually (EFT
stands for “Electronic Funds Transfer”).
14organized, (2) ownership, (3) headquarter location, (4) membership, (5) the number of
cards in circulation, (6) the number of transactions by type (ATM or POS), and (7) the
n u m b e ro ft e r m i n a l sb yt y p e( A T Mo rP O S ) .
Our dataset includes 136 regional EFT networks that existed at some point of time
during the 1985-2006 period.19 Among them, we ﬁrst exclude networks whose ownership
or membership is solely composed of credit unions and/or saving and loan banks (14
networks). Those networks likely behave diﬀerently from networks that provide services
to commercial banks. We then exclude eight networks that entered the market after
1985, the shakeout year. It is reasonable to set 1985 as the shakeout year.20 As shown in
Figure 1, the number of network entrants declined signiﬁcantly after 1985, and the net
number of networks also declined for the ﬁrst time in 1985. Although our sample does
not include all the regional networks that ever existed in 1985, it accounts for about 95
percent of all transactions switched through the EFT networks.21
For each network, its cohort is based on its year of entry, its location is based on its
headquarter address, its ownership type is based on its owner information, and its size is
based on its number of cards in circulation. We denote the networks which entered in the
1970s as the early cohort, and the entrants in the 1980s as the late cohort. The network
location is categorized into three groups: East, Middle, and West. East consists of three
census regions (New England, Mid-Atlantic, and South-Atlantic); Middle consists of four
central census regions (East-North, East-South, West-North, and West-South central);
and West consists of two census regions (Mountain and Paciﬁc). We use two criteria to
characterize network ownership. One is whether the network is owned by a single owner
or multiple owners; and the other is whether the network is owned solely by ﬁnancial
institution(s) or not. A network’s size is either large or small. The top one-third of the
networks ranked by the number of cards in circulation are counted as large networks
19We exclude national EFT networks, such as Cirrus and Plus (national ATM networks) and Interlink
and Maestro (national debit card networks), from our sample because national networks used to play a
diﬀerent role than regional networks. They oﬀered a “bridge” between regional networks. See Hayashi,
Sullivan and Weiner (2003) for details.
20Note that using 1986 or 1987 as the shakeout year does not aﬀect the results.
21The data on switch transactions is from the E F TD a t aB o o k1 9 8 6E d i t i o n .
15and the rest are small networks. Finally, whether each network had adopted POS debit
function or not is based on the information of POS terminals deployed in the network.
The summary statistics of the data are reported in Table 1.
4.2 Debit Adoption
The ﬁrst hypothesis we test is that large ATM networks are more likely to adopt the
debit innovation than small networks. This hypothesis is ﬁrst evaluated using Table 1,
which compares the sample means between POS debit adopters and non-adopters. Each
network’s size, ownership type, and location are based on its 1985 characteristics. We
categorize a network as a POS adopter if it had adopted the POS debit function by the
end of 1987. Among 114 networks in our sample, 39 are found to be POS adopters.
The ﬁndings support the hypothesis. The average size of POS adopting networks
is much larger than non-adopters, and the diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1
percent level. In fact, 56 percent of POS adopting networks are large networks, ranked
among the top one-third of all the networks by the number of cards in circulation.
In contrast, only 23 percent of non-adopters are large networks. On average, a POS
adopting network has three times the number of cards in circulation as a non-adopting
network. However, we ﬁnd no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence between POS adopters
and non-adopters in terms of their entry cohort, ownership, and location.
As a further step, we conduct logit regressions to examine what factors signiﬁcantly
aﬀect POS debit adoption. The results are reported in Table 2. The dependent variable
is POS debit adoption by 1987. Independent variables are based on networks’ 1985
characteristics. Speciﬁcations 1 and 2 include early cohort, location and ownership
dummies as independent variables. However, none of these variables is statistically
signiﬁcant. In speciﬁcation 3, a dummy variable indicating a large network enters along
with all other independent variables. The coeﬃcient of the Large dummy turns out to
be positive and is the only one statistically signiﬁcant. This suggests that the chance of
adopting POS debit increases with network size, but other factors, such as early cohort,
ownership and location, have no signiﬁcant eﬀect.
16Variable
POS      
adopters
Non-        
adopters
Cohort
   Entry year 1979.97 1980.46
   Early cohort 0.359 0.240
Size 
   Number of cards*** 1,390,499 464,817
   Large*** 0.564 0.213
Ownership
   Single owner 0.667 0.600
   Bank owner(s) 0.795 0.813
Location
   East 0.205 0.267
   West 0.179 0.147
Number of networks 39 75
Variable 1




































Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Ownership, location, and size are based on the 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics: Sample Means
Notes: Ownership, location, and size are based on the networks’ 1985 characteristics. 
POS adopters are the networks that had adopted POS debit by 1987. ***: The difference 









17In order to provide some intuitive interpretation for our results, we construct the
predicted probability of adopting POS debit, according to network size. We construct
these probabilities for networks owned by a single bank, located in the Middle region, and
entered in 1980 or later (late cohort). The predicted probability that a large network had
adopted POS debit by 1987 is 78 percent, while the probability for a small counterpart
is only 30 percent.
4.3 Network Survival
4.3.1 Base Regressions
The second hypothesis we test is that ATM/debit networks are more likely to survive
than ATM-only networks, and among ATM-only networks large networks are more likely
to survive than small ones. Note that deﬁning “exit” is critical for our analysis in this
subsection because the ATM and debit card industry experienced a quite large number
of mergers and acquisitions.
We observe two types of network exit: One is simply exiting from the market without
merger or acquisition; and the other is being acquired by or merged with another network
and terminating the network brand. In our sample, 40 networks terminated their brands
due to merger or acquisition. Therefore, we consider two deﬁnitions of “exit” in our
survival analysis. First, we treat both types of exits equally. In the case of merger or
acquisition, we consider a network exiting if the network brand was terminated. Second,
we consider networks that “exit” are the ones that exited from the market without
merger or acquisition. Under this deﬁnition, those networks that were acquired by
or merged with another network and terminated their brand are treated as censored
observations of exits, acknowledging that they might have survived longer if they had
remained independent.22
22If a network simply exits from the market without being acquired by or merged with another
network, it is likely that the network has failed and liquidated. However, if a network is acquired by
or merged with another one, it may not have failed. Rather, in many cases, a successful network can
become a target of merger and acquisition, which means that the network might have survived longer




Figure 2: Survival Functions of Networks: M&A Uncensored
Figures 2 and 3 plot the survival functions for diﬀerent types of networks during
1985-2006 based on the two deﬁnitions of “exit.” In either case, the ﬁnding supports
our theoretical prediction: The ATM/debit networks show the highest survival rates,
and large ATM-only networks are more likely to survive than small ATM-only networks.
Moreover, as we expect, the results are stronger when we consider merger and acquisition
as censored exit.
We analyze network survival using the semi-parametric Cox Proportional Hazards
model. In this model, the conditional hazard function, given the covariate vector ,i s
assumed to take the form:
(;)=0()()
where  is the vector of regression coeﬃcients and 0() denotes the baseline hazard
function. The baseline hazard 0() is left unspeciﬁed, allowing for time-varying hazard
rates due to common industry shocks.
All covariates in vector  are time-invariant.23 Networks that entered in the 1970s
23We also estimated the model using time-varying covariates in our robustness checks and the results




Figure 3: Survival Functions of Networks: M&A Censored
are categorized as Early cohort. Two ownership dummies (Single owner and Bank
owner(s)), two location dummies (East and West), and one size dummy (Large) are based
on the networks’ 1985 characteristics. The POS dummy indicates whether a network has
adopted POS debit by 1987 or not. Finally, the Large ATM dummy indicates whether
a network was ranked among the top one-third of networks in 1985 and remained as an
ATM-only network by 1987 or not.
Table 3 reports the estimation results. Panel A presents the results treating both
types of exits equally and panel B presents the results treating mergers and acquisitions
as censored. Speciﬁcations 1 and 2 include early cohort, location and ownership dum-
mies. Without controlling for network size and POS adoption, no variable is statistically
signiﬁcant in the uncensored model, and only the Single owner dummy is signiﬁcant in
the censored model. As we will explain later, singly owned networks tend to be small so
the Single owner dummy may act as a proxy for network size.
Speciﬁcation 3 includes the POS dummy along with early cohort, location and own-
ership dummies. In both uncensored and censored models, the coeﬃcient for the POS
20Variable 1 2 3 4 5
Early cohort -0.149 -0.197 -0.120 -0.090 -0.069
(0.215) (0.226)  (0.231) (0.230)  (0.233)
East 0.288 0.315 0.280 0.426
*        0.381
(0.232) (0.234) (0.235) (0.240) (0.246)
West -0.123 -0.113 -0.106 -0.063  -0.114
(0.266) (0.268)  (0.270) (0.270) (0.269)
Single owner 0.154 0.122 -0.007 0.031
(0.204) (0.206) (0.216) (0.215)
Bank owner(s) 0.108 -0.011 0.079 -0.051
(0.256)  (0.260) (0.257) (0.262)
POS    -0.473
**          -0.582
***       
 (0.206) (0.220)
Large    -0.455




Log likelihood -445.602 -445.284 -442.533 -443.117 -441.659
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Ownership, location, and size are based on
networks’ 1985 characteristics. POS=1, if a network adopted POS debit by 1987, otherwise 
an ATM-only network. ***, **, *: Significant at  the .01, .05, and .10 level, respectively.
Variable 1 2 3 4 5
Early cohort 0.265 0.196 0.311 0.387 0.405
(0.284) (0.305) (0.313) (0.303) (0.315)
East 0.391 0.463 0.381   0.696
** 0.538
*
(0.312) (0.312) (0.311) (0.316) (0.321)
West -0.176 -0.175 -0.131 -0.013 -0.127
(0.393) (0.393) (0.397) (0.397) (0.398)
Single owner   0.607
**  0.589
* 0.244 0.400
(0.313) (0.319) (0.321) (0.328)
Bank owner(s) -0.229 -0.427 -0.255 -0.493
(0.336) (0.341) (0.333) (0.343)
POS    -1.137
***    -1.279
***
(0.206) (0.220)
Large    -1.291
***
(0.384)
Large ATM  -0.802
*
(0.474)
Log likelihood -248.472 -245.942 -239.223 -238.903 -237.58
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Ownership, location, and size are based on
networks’ 1985 characteristics. POS=1, if a network adopted POS debit by 1987, otherwise 
an ATM-only network. ***, **, *: Significant at  the .01, .05, and .10 level, respectively.
Table 3. Effects on the Hazard of Exit (1985-2006)
Specification
Specification
3B. Mergers and Acquisitions Censored
3A. Mergers and Acquisitions Uncensored 
21dummy is negative and statistically signiﬁcant, which implies networks that have adopted
the POS debit innovation are more likely to survive than networks that have not. While
the coeﬃcient for the POS dummy in the uncensored model is statistically signiﬁcant at
the 5 percent level, the same coeﬃcient in the censored model is statistically signiﬁcant
at the 1 percent level. In addition, the magnitude of the coeﬃc i e n ti sm u c hl a r g e ri nt h e
censored model. These results suggest that networks which have adopted POS debit are
less likely to exit from the market, and if they do, they are more likely to be acquired or
merged with another network. In contrast, networks that have not adopted POS debit
are more likely to exit, especially through failure and liquidation.
Speciﬁcation 4 includes the Large dummy, instead of POS dummy, along with early
cohort, location and ownership dummies. Similar to the POS dummy, the coeﬃcient
for the Large dummy is negative and statistically signiﬁcant in both uncensored and
censored models. The results suggest that large networks are less likely to exit from the
market, and if they do, they are more likely to be acquired or merged.
Finally, speciﬁcation 5 includes the POS and Large ATM dummies, which are mutu-
ally exclusive, along with early cohort, ownership, and location dummies. The coeﬃcient
for the POS dummy is negative and statistically signiﬁcant in both uncensored and cen-
sored models. Meanwhile, the coeﬃcient for Large ATM is negative and statistically
signiﬁcant in the censored model, which suggests that compared with large ATM-only
networks, small ATM-only networks are more likely to exit through failure and liquida-
tion. Note that the coeﬃcient for the POS dummy is much greater than that for the
Large ATM dummy in the censored model (1.28 vs. 0.80). In terms of hazard ratio,
this means an ATM/debit network’s risk of exit relative to a small ATM-only network
is 32 percent, but a large ATM-only network’s risk of exit relative to a small ATM-only
network is 45 percent. These ﬁndings support our hypothesis: ATM/debit networks are
more likely to survive than ATM-only networks, and large ATM-only networks are more
likely to survive than small ATM-only networks.
In speciﬁcations 3-5, after controlling for the network size and/or POS adoption, most
variables except the East dummy are not statistically signiﬁcant. Networks located in
22the East tend to have a higher exit rate than networks located in the other regions,
and the eﬀect becomes more signiﬁcant in the censored model. The coeﬃcient for Early
cohort, being negative in the uncensored model but positive in the censored model, is
never statistically signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcient for Single owner shows a positive sign and
is statistically signiﬁcant in the speciﬁcation 3 of the censored model, where the POS
adoption but not the network size is controlled. Again, this can be explained by that
Single owner dummy may act as a proxy for the size of ATM-only networks. Meanwhile,
the coeﬃcient for Bank owner(s) shows a negative sign in all speciﬁcations of the censored
model, but is never statistically signiﬁcant. Among these ﬁndings, the eﬀects of Early
cohort and Single owner are particularly interesting and in contrast to previous studies
in the literature. We will further examine them in Subsection 4.4.
4.3.2 Robustness Checks
In addition to the above base regressions, we perform a series of robustness checks.
First, we re-estimate the hazard model on a sub-sample consisting of years 1985-1995.
Recall that more industry changes took places after the mid 1990s, such as interstate
banking deregulation and increasing nonbank ownership. While our base regressions
leave the baseline hazard function unspeciﬁed to allow for time-varying hazard rates,
using the pre-1995 sub-sample provides an alternative way to isolate the later industry
shocks. The results, as shown in Table A in the Appendix, are very similar to our base
regression results.
Second, we re-estimate the hazard model using time-varying covariates so that a
network’s characteristics at the time of exit together with the information on its survival
up to that period are used in explaining the network’s hazard rate. The results, reported
in the Appendix Table B, again are very similar.
Third, we check for potential endogeneity issues. One concern is that if the POS
debit adopters were mainly large networks, they might have other advantages, besides
adopting the debit innovation, that determined their higher survival rates than small
networks. One way to address this concern is to re-estimate the hazard model within
23the subgroup of large or small networks. The results, reported in the Appendix Table C,
conﬁrm our base ﬁndings: Even within the subgroup of large or small networks, adopting
the debit innovation signiﬁcantly reduces the hazard of network exit.
Fourth, re-estimating the hazard model based on propensity scores is another way
to address some of the endogeneity concerns, such as the potential reverse causality
between debit adoption and network survival. Using the result of our debit adoption
regression (Table 2, speciﬁcation 3), we ﬁrst calculate the propensity score of debit
adoption for each network. We then re-estimate the hazard model within the subgroup
of networks whose propensity scores are ranked among the top or bottom quarter. In
the top or bottom subgroup, the networks are similar in size, either all large or all small.
After controlling for the propensity score, the adoption of POS debit is presumably
purely random. The results, reported in the Appendix Table D, again conﬁrm our base
ﬁndings: Even within the subgroup of networks with similar propensity scores, adopting
the debit innovation signiﬁcantly reduces the hazard of network exit.
Finally, we consider alternative measures of network size. In our base regressions,
an ATM network’s size is measured by its number of cards in circulation. Alternatively,
we use the number of ATM transactions or the number of ATM terminals to measure
network size. Again, the results are very similar.
4.4 First-Mover (Dis)Advantages
The ﬁnding that early entrants in the ATM and debit card industry do not show sig-
niﬁcant advantages in product innovation and network survival is in sharp contrast to
previous studies in the literature. Those studies, focusing on shakeouts in manufacturing
industries, typically found that early entrants enjoy substantial ﬁrst-mover advantages.
As explained in Klepper (1996), early entrants have time to build a large production
scale, which makes it easier for them to adopt technological innovations because the
resulting decrease in average cost can be applied over a larger level of output than for
other ﬁrms. As price-cost margins decline over time, late entrant are the ﬁrst to succumb
to competitive exit and the early entrants eventually take over an increasing share of the
24industry’s output. Therefore, early entrants are more likely to adopt innovations and
survive the shakeout.
However, this mechanism does not appear to play an important role in the ATM
and debit card industry. Table 4 presents a correlation analysis between variables on
network size, entry cohort, ownership and location, based on the information in 1985.
The results show no statistically signiﬁcant correlation between Early cohort and Large
network. Rather, both Early cohort and Large network are signiﬁcantly correlated with
network ownership structures — Single owner and/or Bank owner(s).
To further explore the issue, we conduct logit regressions using either Early cohort or
Large network as the dependent variable. The results are reported in Table 5. The coeﬃ-
cients for Single owner and Bank owner(s) are found positive and statistically signiﬁcant
in the Early cohort regression, indicating the bias of early entrants’ ownership structure.
In the Large network regression, without controlling for ownership, the coeﬃcient of
Early cohort shows a positive sign but is not statistically signiﬁcant. After controlling
for ownership, the eﬀect of Early cohort becomes stronger though still not statistically
signiﬁcant.24 Meanwhile, the coeﬃcients for Single owner and Bank owner(s) are both
negative in the Large network regression, and the Single owner is statistically signiﬁ-
cant. These ﬁndings suggest that early entrants in the ATM and debit card industry
did not enjoy strong ﬁrst-mover advantages, but rather suﬀered some disadvantages in
organizational structure.
In fact, our theoretical model can shed some light on these ﬁn d i n g s .A c c o r d i n gt oo u r
theory, a potential entrant may either pay a low cost to enter as a small network or pay a
high cost to enter as a large network. If we interpret the time and eﬀorts on coordinating
among network partners as a part of the entry cost, then early entrants are more likely
to be singly owned small networks and late entrants are more likely to be jointly owned
large networks. Therefore, even if there were some ﬁrst-mover advantages, they would
be partially oﬀset by the early entrants’ disadvantages in organizational structure.
24B a s e do nt h ec o e ﬃcient estimates of the logit regressions, we can construct the marginal eﬀects
of Early cohort on Large network. The results show that the eﬀect is stronger if the ownership is
controlled.
25   Variable
Large Early 
cohort





Large 1 0.014     -0.256
***   0.016  0.051
(0.884)  (0.006)   (0.868)  (0.590)
Early cohort 1     0.204
**     0.207
** -0.003
 (0.029)  (0.028) (0.976)
Single owner 1 -0.060 0.089
 (0.529) (0.347)
Bank owner(s) 1     -0.093
(0.325)















Table 4. Correlation: Size, Cohort, Ownership, and Location
East




*   
 (0.745)
1
Notes: P-values are in parentheses. Ownership, location, and size are based on the networks’ 
1985 characteristics. ***, **, *: Significant at the .01, .05, and .10 level, respectively.
Table 5. Logit Models: Early Cohort and Large Network
 Variable Early cohort
Large
Spec.1 Spec.2
    -2.941
***      -1.298
*** -0.702
(0.892)  (0.334) (0.612)
0.332 0.629
 (0.468) (0.506)
    1.092
**   -1.208
***
(0.452)
    1.731








-0.176  0.751 0.923
 (0.620)
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Ownership, location, and size are based on the 
networks’ 1985 characteristics. ***, **, *: Significant at the .01, .05, and .10 level, respectively.
 (0.565) (0.594)
-60.272 -68.215  -64.476    
 (0.618)
26The ﬁnding that early entrants may suﬀer disadvantages in organizational structures
is not unique to the ATM and debit card industry, but also is supported by evidence
from other network industries. For example, the U.S. credit card industry started in the
1950s and the earliest entrants were mainly singly owned, proprietary systems, such as
Diners Club, American Express as well as many other small ones. It was not until the
mid 1960s, the co-opetitive model emerged when banks formed associations to market
their cards jointly. These card associations were owned and operated by member banks,
which competed for merchants and cardholders but cooperated at the card system level
by setting operational standard. Eventually, the credit card industry was dominated
by two largest co-opetitive networks, Visa and MasterCard, which account for more
than 80 percent of U.S. credit card market share today (Evans and Schmalensee, 2005).
A similar but more recent example is the U.S. smartphone operating system industry,
where a later entrant, the open-source Android system, is surpassing the ﬁrst movers
— the closed source, proprietary systems of iPhone and Blackberry — in terms of new
handsets sold and total subscribers.25
5C o n c l u s i o n
The U.S. ATM and debit card industry is an intriguing example of the broader debate on
industrial evolution. Unlike most manufacturing industries studied in the literature, the
ATM and debit card industry is a ﬁnancial service industry featuring strong network
eﬀects. The industry started with a few shared ATM networks in the early 1970s.
25The major players in the U.S. Smartphone operating system industry are the Blackberry, iPhone
and Android, which were introduced in 2002, 2007 and 2008 respectively. Both Blackberry and iPhone
operating systems are closed source, proprietary systems, which restrict the use of third party software
and require exclusive devices (Blackberry or iPhone). The iPhone also exclusively operates on the
AT&T network. In contrast, the Android was an eﬀort by a consortium of hardware, software, and
telecom companies devoted to advancing open standards for mobile devices. Multiple devices can run on
the Android platform, and the phones can operate on any network in the Open Handset Alliance (which
includes T-Mobile, AT&T, Verizon, Sprint). According to the NPD Group, a leading market research
company, Android’s operating system was installed in 44 percent of all smartphones purchased in the
third quarter 2010, comparing with 23 percent for the iPhones and 22 percent for the Blackberries. In
terms of total subscribers, Android is expected to surpass iPhone and Blackberry in the ﬁrst quarter of
2011 if the current trends hold up.
27The number of shared networks grew rapidly until the mid 1980s, but declined sharply
afterwards. This raises interesting research questions: What drove the industry shakeout
in spite of the rising ATM transaction volume? Which ATM networks had fared better
than others through the consolidation?
This paper sheds light on these questions by focusing on the role that a major
network-enhancing product innovation — introducing the debit function in the mid 1980s
— played in driving the network consolidation. We construct a theoretic model to char-
acterize the impact of the debit innovation. The debit function allows customers to
use ATM/debit cards to pay for goods and services at retail places, which extends the
industry from a one-sided market of ATM services into a two-sided market serving both
consumers and merchants at the point of sale. As a result, the enhanced network eﬀects
spurred a debit adoption race among the ATM networks, in which large networks had
better advantages due to their cardholder base and infrastructures in place. Eventually,
the winners of the race survived and expanded, and the losers had to exit.
While introducing the POS debit function was not the only force shaping the in-
dustry evolution, by focusing on this major event, we are able to sort out the complex
relations among product innovation, industry shakeout and network survival. The theo-
retical hypotheses are tested using a novel dataset on network entry, exit, size, location,
ownership and product choices. Consistent with the theory, we ﬁnd that large ATM
networks had a better chance of adopting the debit innovation and surviving the shake-
out. Moreover, in contrast to previous studies, we ﬁnd little advantage of being an early
entrant in this network industry. Rather, ownership and organizational structure had
an important inﬂuence on network size and survival.
28Variable 1 2 3 4 5
Early cohort 0.287 0.198 0.319 0.380 0.410
(0.284) (0.303) (0.313) (0.302) (0.316)
East 0.376 0.453 0.374  0.694
** 0.519
(0.311) (0.311) (0.310) (0.315) (0.320)
West -0.164 -0.186 -0.126 -0.014 -0.115
(0.393) (0.393) (0.397) (0.398) (0.398)
Single owner  0.626
**  0.618
* 0.295 0.450
(0.315) (0.321) (0.323) (0.330)
Bank owner(s) -0.256 -0.440 -0.286 -0.504










Log likelihood -252.901 -250.174 -243.671 -243.751 -242.277
Variable 1 2 3 4 5
Early cohort 0.184 0.105 0.223 0.237 0.295
(0.249) (0.254) (0.257) (0.257) (0.258)
East 0.260 0.257 0.491
* 0.466  0.576
*
(0.280) (0.280) (0.292) (0.288) (0.297)
West 0.040 0.048 0.238 0.099 0.225
(0.339) (0.341) (0.350) (0.342) (0.350)
Single owner   0.732
** 0.465 0.504 0.372
(0.315) (0.325) (0.316) (0.327)
Bank owner(s) 0.168 -0.034 0.091 -0.012
(0.298) (0.301) (0.300) (0.300)
POS   -0.898
***    -1.027
***
(0.306) (0.312)






Log likelihood -293.502 -290.435 -285.622 -283.317 -283.797
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Ownership, location, and size are based on the 
networks’ 1985 characteristics. POS=1, if a network adopted POS debit by 1987, otherwise an 
ATM-only network. ***, **, *: Significant at the .01, .05, and .10 level, respectively.
Specification
Specification
Table A. Effects on the Hazard of Exit (1985-1995)
Mergers and Acquisitions Censored
Table B. Effects on the Hazard of Exit (1985-2006)
Time-varying Covariates
Mergers and Acquisitions Censored
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Ownership, location, and size are based on the 
networks’ 1985 characteristics. POS=1, if a network adopted POS debit by 1987, otherwise an 
ATM-only network. ***, **, *: Significant at the .01, .05, and .10 level, respectively.
29Variable Spec.1 Spec.2 Spec.1 Spec.2
Early cohort 0.395 -0.606 0.426 0.486
(0.909) (1.034) (0.323) (0.332)
East   1.512
* 1.072   0.600
* 0.525
(0.830) (0.808) (0.360) (0.360)
West -0.048 0.326 0.071 0.007
(1.168) (1.199) (0.425) (0.429)
Single owner 1.287    2.246
** 0.072 0.094
(0.804) (1.057) (0.345) (0.348)
Bank owner(s) -1.184 -0.855 -0.142 -0.336





Log likelihood -26.489 -24.447 -185.944 -184.212
Number of networks 38 38 76 76
Variable Spec.1 Spec.2 Spec.1 Spec.2
Early cohort 0.460 -0.778 0.699   1.007
*
(0.995) (1.156) (0.515) (0.520)
East   2.085
* 1.518 0.870 0.251
(1.198) (1.041) (0.638) (0.677)
West 0.517 0.984 -0.519 -0.269
(1.264) (1.378) (0.715) (0.841)
Single owner -0.119 1.053 -0.298 0.213
(1.302) (1.378) (0.557) (0.619)
Bank owner(s)  -1.577
* -0.897  -0.847
*    -1.532
***
(1.326) (1.183) (0.481) (0.533)
POS -1.951
*    -2.015
**
(1.030) (0.862)
Log likelihood -17.524 -15.697 -76.499 -72.578
Number of networks 25 25 40 40
Table C. Effects on the Hazard of Exit (1985-2006)
Separate Estimation for Large and Small Networks
Mergers and Acquisition Censored
Table D. Effects on the Hazard of Exit (1985-2006)
Separate Estimation for Top and Bottom Quarters in Propensity Score
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Ownership, location, and size are based on the networks’ 
1985 characteristics. POS=1, if a network adopted POS debit by 1987, otherwise an ATM-only 
network. ***, **, *: Significant at the .01, .05, and .10 level, respectively.
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Ownership, location, and size are based on the networks’ 
1985 characteristics. POS=1, if a network adopted POS debit by 1987, otherwise an ATM-only 
network. ***, **, *: Significant at the .01, .05, and .10 level, respectively.
Large Small
Top Bottom
Mergers and Acquisition Censored
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